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CASENOTES
SKINNER V. REED-PRENTICE: THE
APPLICATION OF CONTRIBUTION TO
STRICT PRODUCT LIABILITY
The allocation of damages among multiple tortfeasors who
may be found liable to an injured plaintiff is the subject of extensive legislative and judicial action across the nation.' Forms
of contribution and indemnity are supplanting former standards
that precluded the shifting or spreading of loss among responsible parties. Historically, under the common law rule, loss remained where the victim imposed it.2 A plaintiff had sole
discretion over his choice of potential defendants in seeking recovery,3 allowing his whim or spite to govern the imposition of
liability. 4 Thus, an injured party could not only choose whom to
sue, but upon receiving a judgment against multiple defendants
he could also decide from whom to collect. 5 Tortfeasors excluded by the plaintiff from the action or from collection of a
'6
judgment got off "scot free."
The development of contribution and indemnity has countered some of the inequities 7 arising from the common law rule
of liability among multiple tortfeasors. Although both contribu1. See Ferrini, The Evolutionfrom Indemnity to Contribution-A Question of the Future,if Any, of Indemnity, 59 CHI. B. REC. 254 (1978) [hereinaf-

ter cited as Ferrini, From Indemnity to Contribution]. See also note 15
infra.
2. Comment, The Allocation of Loss Among Joint Tortfeasors, 41 S.
CAI. L. REV. 728 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Allocation of Loss].

3. Id. at 732. At common law a victim could place the "entire loss on A,
or on both A and B, or on A, B and C either in equal or unequal proportion."
4. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 307, § 50 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter
cited as

PROSSER];

see Allocation of Loss, supra note 2, at 732 (the victim's

choice of defendants was not necessarily predicated upon factors which
served tort goals, such as retribution, deterrence, and loss spreading).
5. Where defendants were joined, each was liable for the entire
amount of the judgment, and plaintiff could levy against any defendant.
See PROSSER, supra note 4, § 50, at 307.
6. Id.
7. At common law there was no relief available for a defendant against

whom a judgment was levied, regardless of how little his conduct actually
contributed to a plaintiff's injury; he could recover from neither a co-defendant nor a responsible person not a party in the action, making it possible to
impose full liability upon one who was responsible for only a very small
percentage of the harm. See Schwartz, Li v. Yellow Cab Company: A Survey of CaliforniaPractice Under Comparative Negligence, 7 PAC. LJ. 747,
764 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Schwartz, Practice Under Comparative
Negligence ].
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tion and indemnity impair a plaintiffs ability to impose loss selectively, each is a distinct doctrine. Contribution, which
originated in equity 8 and is commonly applied pro rata,9 distributes loss by requiring each tortfeasor to pay a proportionate
share of the whole; indemnity shifts the entire loss from the
party upon whom it has been imposed to another who should
bear it instead. 10
A common law rule against contribution among joint
tortfeasors stemmed from the 1799 case of Merryweather v.
Nixan," which denied contribution where the action upon
which liability was predicated was a tort. At the time of
Merryweather, however, "tort" designated willful or intentional

wrongs, and the actual holding of the case was correspondingly
limited to prohibiting contribution for only willful or intentional
wrongs. 12 The courts subsequently carved out an exception to
the general rule allowing contribution. 13 Early American cases
applied the no-contribution rule to cases of willful misconduct
but not to negligent torts. When joinder was extended to parties who had merely caused the same damage, the rule was applied generally to all torts without regard to its origin. 14 Courts
and, more commonly, legislatures have revived contribution in
15
varying forms in many states.
8. Jensvold, A Modern Approach to Loss Allocation Among Tortfeasors
in Products Liability Cases, 58 MINN. L. REV. 723, 726 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as Jensvold, A Modern Approach].
9. See Allocation of Loss, supra note 2, at 734. Pro rata distribution of
loss is an equal apportionment, but in some jurisdictions "the distribution
of liability is in proportion to the comparative fault of the parties." PRosSER, supra note 4, § 51, at 310.
' The pro rata share of one joint tortfeasor is determined by dividing the
total judgment by the number of the tortfeasors, excluding those who are
insolvent or could not be made parties to the action." Comment, The Mary
CarterAgreement-Solving the Problems of Collusive Settlements in Joint
Tort Actions, 47 S. CAL.L. REV. 1393, 1404 n. 64 (1974).
10. PaOSSER, supra note 4, § 51, at 310. See notes 16-20 and accompanying text infra.
11. 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (1799). In Merryweather a joint judgment had
been entered against two defendants in a prior conversion action but levied
against only one.
12. See id.
13. Note, Contribution Between Persons Jointly Charged for Negligence-Merryweatherv. Nixan, 12 HARv. L. REV. 176, 177-78 (1898).
14. PROSSER, supranote 4, § 50, at 306. At the time of the Merryweather
decision, joinder was possible only for parties acting in concert. Id. at 305.
15. See Allocation of Loss, supra note 2, at 735. Some jurisdictions limit
contribution to joint judgment defendants (Delaware, California, Michigan,
Mississippi, North Carolina, Texas), some have adopted the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, which allows for contribution with or
without a joint judgment (Arkansas, Hawaii, Maryland, Pennsylvania,
South Dakota, Massachusetts), and some do not specify (Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, New Jersey, Wisconsin).
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Whereas contribution is based upon spreading loss where
there is a common liability, indemnity concentrates on the relationship of the parties and completely shifts the loss from one
party to another. It may be grounded upon contract or implied
by operation of law. 16 Confusion has existed as to when indemnity will operate, and hence the courts have developed a variety
of tests-whether the parties are actively or passively negligent 17 or primarily or secondarily liable, 18 whether a duty existed between them, whether a contract can be implied, as well
as general equitable considerations. 19 The relative culpability
of the parties' actions often determines whether indemnity will
lie, 20 with liability shifting to the party more directly responsible. Since the standards for indemnity are so varied, confusion
and inconsistency have permeated its application.
Allocation of loss becomes even more complex when the
doctrines of indemnity and contribution are invoked in strict liability cases. There is an inherent conflict in the policies underlying indemnity and contribution and those behind strict
liability. Strict liability in product actions has developed primarily to protect injured consumers and is designed to protect
plaintiffs' rights, 21 while indemnity and contribution are by their
nature tools for promoting fairness to defendants and focus on
defendants' rights. 22 The concept of fault is a key factor in the
proper distribution of liability among tortfeasors in negligence
23
actions, but theoretically it has no place in strict liability.
However, in product liability cases, the common existence of
multiple potential defendants creates a natural situation for
claims for contribution and indemnity among the parties. 24 The
16. See PROSSER, supra note 4, § 51, at 310.

17. See Allocation of Loss, supra note 2, at 738. The active-passive test
is based on the relative causal connections of the liable parties' actions to
the victim's harm, and the active tortfeasor indemnifies the passive party.
See also notes 44-52 and accompanying text infra.
18. See Allocation of Loss, supra note 2, at 738-39. The distinction between primary and secondary liability is grounded on the type of duty owed
to the victim; the party who is secondarily liable (for example, by virtue of a
duty arising from a legal relation) is entitled to indemnity from the party
primarily liable.
19. Id. at 738-43.
20. Jensvold, A Modern Approach, supra note 8, at 724. "Concepts of
'fault' and 'duty'. .. are often determinative of the rights of defendants inter se."
21. See notes 65-72 and accompanying text infra.
22. See Jensvold, A Modern Approach, supra note 8, at 723.

23. Id. at 724.
24. See Phillips, Contribution and Indemnity in Products Liability, 42
TENN. L REV. 85, 85 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Phillips, Contribution and

Indemnity] which states:
The volume and complexity of [litigation in the products field concern-
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many problems underlying the application of contribution and
indemnity to strict liability, further complicated by the applicability of a workmen's compensation statute, 25 culminated in Illinois when the supreme court was called upon to decide Skinner
26

v. Reed-Prentice Division Package Machinery Company.
THE SKINNER CASE

Skinner was an action grounded in strict liability against
Reed-Prentice Division Package Machinery Company (hereinafter referred to as Reed). Plaintiff, Rita Rae Skinner, sought to
recover damages for personal injuries that she sustained during
the course of her employment 27 with third-party defendant,
Hinckley Plastic, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as Hinckley), as
the result of the malfunction of a machine manufactured by
Reed.2 8 In its answer, Reed pleaded the defenses of misuse of
the machine and assumption of risk by plaintiff.29 Reed also
filed a third-party complaint against Hinckley seeking contribution, in the event of a judgment for plaintiff against Reed, in
such amount "as would be commensurate with the degree of
misconduct attributable to the [employer]-30 and charged negliing contribution and indemnity] have notably increased over previous
years. This increase may be explained at least in part... by the fact
that usually there are potentially multiple defendants in a products
case, thus giving rise to the possibility of claims for contribution or indemnity between or among the parties.
25. The applicability of the Illinois Workmen's Compensation Act in the
case at issue presented problems in that, although it limits liability of an
employer, contribution was sought from an employer in excess of the
amount governed by workmen's compensation. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, §
138.11 (1977).
[TJhe potential conflict between policies favoring apportionment of liability and those underlying workmen's compensation laws present special problems. Workmen's compensation laws are designed not only to
liberalize the basis for an employee's claim against his employer arising
out of and in the course of employment, but also limit the amount of the
employee's claim against the employer.
Phillips, Contributionand Indemnity, supra note 24, at 108 (footnotes omitted).
26. 70 Mn. 2d 1, 374 N.E.2d 437 (1977). Two other cases were decided with
Skinner on the same basis and rely on the Skinner opinion's discussion of
2d 41, 374 N.E.2d 455 (1977)
the issues. See Stevens v. Silver Mfg. Co., 70 Ill.
2d 47, 374 N.E.2d 458
and Robinson v. International Harvester Co., 70 Ill.
(1977).
27. Plaintiff was injured when an injection molding machine manufactured by Reed malfunctioned. 70 11l. 2d at 4, 374 N.E.2d at 438.
28. Plaintiffs complaint alleged that, when manufactured and sold, the
machine causing her injuries was defective and unreasonably dangerous
for use for its intended purpose and that it was improperly designed and
lacking in safety devices. Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Div. Package Mach. Co.,
40 nl. App. 3d 99, 100, 351 N.E.2d 405, 406 (1976).
29. Id., 351 N.E.2d at 406.
30. 70 m. 2d at 5, 374 N.E.2d at 438.
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31
gence on the part of the employer in using the machine.
Reed's third-party complaint was dismissed on Hinckley's motion 32 and the appellate court affirmed, from which Reed appealed.
On appeal, the supreme court, amid strong dissent, reversed
the appellate court's decision, holding that the third-party complaint stated a cause of action for contribution based on Hinckley's assumption of risk or misuse of the product. 33 This note
will analyze the several major areas of contention discussed by
the supreme court in Skinner.

HistoricalPerspectives of Contribution and Indemnity in
Illinois
The court, after reviewing existing law in Illinois, concludes
that "there is no valid reason for the continued existence of the
Although this is a definitive step tono-contribution rule."''
ward clarifying the status of contribution in Illinois, it is not as
revolutionary as it sounds, since it is questionable whether a
35
rule against contribution in fact ever existed in Illinois.
The Illinois Supreme Court first indicated that it followed
the Merryweather rule3 6 in 1856 when it distinguished the right
to indemnity from a right to contribution and articulated an in31. The manufacturer's third-party complaint alleged that the unreasonably dangerous condition of the machine when plaintiff was injured, if any,
"was substantially and proximately caused by the negligent acts and omissions of the intervening owners of said machine and of the Employer" and
that the employer was negligent in purchasing and operating a used
machine in such poor state and which was no longer in the condition in
which the manufacturer sold it. 40 Ill. App. 3d at 100-01, 351 N.E.2d at 406-07.
32. Hinckley fied a motion to strike the complaint on the ground that
any negligence of Reed in its manufacture of the defective product, as alleged by plaintiff, was necessarily active and that therefore Reed would not
be entitled to indemnity regardless of whether Hinckley's alleged negligence was active or passive, and that Illinois law prohibited contribution
between co-tortfeasors. Id. at 101, 351 N.E.2d at 407.
33. 70 Ill. 2d at 16, 374 N.E.2d at 443, wherein the court held:
[T] he third-party complaint, although pleaded in terms of negligence,
alleges misuse of the product and assumption of risk on the part of the
employer and states a cause of action for contribution based on the relative degree to which the defective product and the employer's misuse
of the product or its assumption of the risk contributed to cause
plaintiff's injuries.
34. Id. at 13, 374 N.E.2d at 442.
35. Polelle, ContributionAmong Negligent Joint Tortfeasors in Illinois:
A Squeamish Damsel Comes of Age, 1 Loy. CHI. L.J. 267, 268 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Polelle, Contribution in Illinois] states that "[a] historical
study of case law does not support the supposedly well-settled proposition
that contribution is prohibited between negligent joint tortfeasors in Illinois. The law is considered well-settled largely because it has become an
unquestioned shibboleth."
36. See notes 11-13 and accompanying text supra.
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tentional-unintentional test for indemnity.3 7 Later, in what the
Skinner court characterizes as the only previous case in which
the supreme court explicitly has ruled on the contribution question,3 8 contribution among unintentional tortfeasors was allowed.3 9 The supreme court has oscillated in its treatment of
contribution. The apparent general rule against contribution
has been used, for example, to support both denials 4° and allowances 4 1 of joinder of parties as defendants. On the other
hand, an intentional-unintentional test has been recognized as
to whether a right to contribution exists,42 as has the distinction
of whether or not the parties acted in concert. 43 Although there
was no decisive authority against a right to contribution among
unintentionaltortfeasors, there was a general consensus of judicial dicta that there was no right to contribution.
Despite the reluctance to reject the apparent no-contribution rule, the courts were dissatisfied with it and resorted to the
concept of indemnity to compensate. 44 Active-passive negligence criteria were introduced 4 5 and extended to implied in37. Nelson v. Cook, 17 Ill. 443 (1856). In an action by a sheriff seeking
recovery of the amount he had paid for improperly converting the goods of
another from the person who had directed the conversion, the court held
that a prohibition against contribution would not affect a right to indemnity,
which would be barred only when the indemnitee knowingly commits a
wrong. The sheriff was denied recovery on other grounds.
38. 70 Ill. 2d at 8, 374 N.E.2d at 440.
39. Farwell v. Becker, 129 Ill. 261, 21 N.E. 792 (1889). Creditors sought to
attach their debtors' property under the belief that it had been sold to defraud the creditors, and a distinction was made between those who knowingly commit a wrong and are not entitled to contribution and those who are
unintentional tortfeasors and have a right to contribution.
40. Johnson v. Chicago &Pac. Elevator Co., 105 Ill. 462 (1882). The court
refused to join as a defendant a party who anticipated liability to the plaintiff in the case and requested joinder in order to defend its rights, saying
there was no right to contribution.
41. Consolidated Ice Mach. Co. v. Keifer, 134 Ill. 481, 25 N.E. 799 (1890).
In upholding the joinder of two defendants who concurrently had injured
plaintiff's deceased, the court stated that defendants could not seek contribution from one another and that the court would not apportion damages;
however, the statement prohibiting contribution was dictum since the case
was decided on the basis of joinder.
42. Wanack v. Michels, 215 IM.87, 74 N.E. 84 (1905). A saloonkeeper liable to plaintiff under the Dram Shop Act was held to have acted intentionally by virtue of his knowledge that liquor would be served and therefore
was not entitled to contribution, implying that a negligent defendant could
have received contribution.
43. Skala v. Lehon, 343 Ill. 602, 175 N.E. 832 (1931) (in a tort action
against master and servant as joint tortfeasors in automobile collision, the
rule against contribution was not applicable when parties are not in pari
delicto).
44. See Polelle, Contributionin Illinois, supra note 35, at 267.
45. John Grifflths & Son Co. v. National Fireproofing Co., 310 Ill. 331, 141
N.E. 739 (1923). Here, the court upheld indemnification of a liable party
who was guilty of no moral turpitude and who, though negligent, was not
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demnity. 46 The active-passive distinction was inconsistently
applied in the appellate court, however, 47 and as a result the
courts began to lose sight of the original purpose of the activepassive doctrine. 48
In an attempt to establish guidelines, subsequent supreme
court cases employed a qualitative distinction as a basis for indemnity in light of the no-contribution rule4 9 but continued to
use active-passive principles. 50 Acknowledging that implied indemnity had been used to mitigate the harsh effect of no-contribution, the court nevertheless attempted to narrow indemnity
by requiring a relationship between the parties that would give
rise to indemnity.5 1 Indemnity was further altered, almost beprimarily liable. A general contractor liable to plaintiff under the Illinois
Scaffold Act received indemnity from a subcontractor. The court stated:
1W] here one does the act which produces the injury and the other does

not join the act but is thereby exposed to liability and suffers damage

the latter may recover against the principal delinquent, and the law will

inquire into the real delinquency and place the ultimate liability upon
him whose fault was the primary cause of the injury.
Id. at 339, 141 N.E. at 742.

App.
46. Gulf, Mobile & Ohio R.R. v. Arthur Dixon Transfer Co., 343 Ill.
148, 98 N.E.2d 783 (1951) (following John Griffiths & Son: One may recover

damages from a third party after paying claims for which he is without
fault).
47. Sargent v. Interstate Bakeries, Inc., 86 Ill. App. 2d 187, 229 N.E.2d 769
(1967) (the defendant who drove the vehicle which struck plaintiff was ordered to indemnify the defendant who parked in a crosswalk and was found
guilty of passive negligence); Stewart v. Mister Softee of Ill., Inc., 75 Ill. App.
2d 328, 221 N.E.2d 11 (1966) (the owner of a double-parked truck was denied
indemnity against the driver who injured the plaintiff); Drell v. American
App. 2d 129, 207 N.E.2d 101 (1965) (the defendant
Bank & Trust Co., 57 Ill.
who left an oxygen tank on a walkway was refused indemnity from a codefendant whose dog injured plaintiff by upsetting the tank); Reynolds v.
Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 51 Ill. App. 2d 334, 201 N.E.2d 322 (1964) (a defendant
who had illegally parked his car near a crosswalk, blocking the vision of the
driver who injured plaintiff, was allowed indemnity from the driver, a codefendant). Indemnity in these cases was denied if a defendant's conduct
was construed to be active negligence but permitted if found to be passive.
The cases, however, are not reconcilable on their facts.
48. See Polelle, Contribution in Illinois, supra note 35, at 277. 'The active-passive test was designed to shift the entire burden of liability only in
those cases where the non-existent fault of a joint tortfeasor made such a
shift easy to justify."
49. Chicago & Ill. Midland Ry. v. Evans Constr. Co., 32 IlM. 2d 600, 208
N.E.2d 573 (1965). "[I]t is necessary to draw a qualitative distinction between the negligence of the two tortfeasors if the action for indemnity is to
succeed." Id. at 603, 208 N.E.2d at 574. The court did not elaborate on what
a "qualitative distinction" is, but it seems to denote that the character
rather than amount of negligence is the key to liability.
50. Miller v. DeWitt, 37 Ill. 2d 273, 226 N.E.2d 630 (1967). Here the court
approved of indemnity flowing from an actively negligent employer,
notwithstanding workmen's compensation limitations, to a third party who
was not actively negligent.
51. Muhlbauer v. Kruzel, 39 Ill. 2d 226, 231-32, 234 N.E.2d 790, 793 (1968)
("a third-party complaint [seeking indemnity] must disclose some relation-
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yond recognition, in a case creating a partial "indemnity" for the
52
amount of damages attributable to the fault of the indemnitor.
The Court's Solution: Contribution
The Skinner court, after reviewing the status of contribution
and indemnity in Illinois, concludes that "application of the nothat the activecontribution rule causes unjust results and.
the harsh
to
mitigate
designed
was
indemnity
passive theory of
' 53
of
uncertainty
the
Notwithstanding
effects of its application.
in
negligence
contribution
whether an authoritative rule against

situations actually existed, the courts had become restricted by
such a rule.54 Disapproving of its unfair results, the courts used
the active-passive standards for indemnity to rectify the conse-

quent injustice. The increasing application of indemnity, however, had led to a convolution of the original active-passive
principles. 5 5 Thus the Skinner court's dissatisfaction with the
so-called no-contribution rule was well-founded, and the court
was easily able to rebut the original rationale for a no-contribu56
tion rule.
ship upon which a duty to indemnify may be predicated"). In this case, a
grocer found liable to a person injured on the sidewalk in front of his store
was denied indemnity from the company whose promotional entertainment
had drawn a crowd to the store and caused plaintiff's injury, for failing to
establish such a relationship.
52. Gertz v. Campbell, 55 Ill. 2d 84, 302 N.E.2d 40 (1973). In this case the
negligent automobile driver who injured plaintiff was permitted to recover
from a doctor the amount that the doctor's malpractice increased the plaintiff's injuries. Here, although the court refers to indemnity, which denotes
the shifting of the entire burden of liability (see note 10 and accompanying
text supra),they divided liability among the parties according to the extent
for which each was at fault, which connotes contribution. The court said:
It is true [the negligent driver] does not seek indemnity for the total
recovery for the plaintiff, but he does seek indemnity for the total damages attributable to the fault of (the doctor]. He is not seeking to pass
on any consequences of his own fault; he is saying that in justice he
should not be required to bear the burden of consequences brought
about solely by the malpractice.
Id. at 90, 302 N.E.2d at 44.
53. 70 Ill. 2d at 12, 374 N.E.2d at 442.
54. See notes 34-52 and accompanying text supra.
55. See Polelle, Contributionin Illinois, supra note 35, at 279-80.
56. In addressing the original basis of the rule against contribution, the
court notes that the reluctance of courts to be used for the relief of wrongdoers was intended to apply to intentional wrongdoers; that the conservation of judicial time and effort is hardly aided by the absence of contribution
since the "qualitative distinction between the negligence of the two
tortfeasors," dictated by the active-passive test, demands specifications as
tedious and elusive as would a determination of rights under contribution.
In addition, the opportunity for fraud and collusion when contribution cannot be invoked further burdens the courts. 70 Ill. 2d at 12-13, 374 N.E.2d at
442. Another theory, not addressed by the court, which is used to justify
the no-contribution rule, is that a wrongdoer would be deterred by unappor-
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By emphasizing the weaknesses, problems, and inequities
of allocating loss without the availability of contribution, the
Skinner court makes a convincing argument for asserting contribution. However, the authority cited in the majority opinion
is directed toward the apportionment of liability among
negligent tortfeasors. The majority supports its stand for con57
tribution by repeated reference to negligence cases and fault
and also relies on the recommendations of a judicial conference
study committee that contribution be adopted and liability "apportioned on the basis of ... pure relative fault. '58 The court
cites Gertz v. Campbell59 as "illustrative of the 'continuing
search for better solutions' "60 and distinguishes it from Skinner
in that the third-party defendant's misconduct in Gertz was subsequent to that of the third-party plaintiff.6 1 Another important
distinction, which the court did not mention, is that in Gertz
both parties between whom damages were apportioned were
negligent. The Skinner court also alludes to the consideration
in Gertz of adopting the New York rule set forth in Dole v. Dow
Chemical Company62 but again fails to note that Dole involved
contribution between two negligent parties.
The rationale for allocating loss among parties with a common denominator of culpability, such as negligence, cannot be
transferred categorically to a situation such as Skinner where
contribution is sought among parties who are potentially liable
on different theories-negligence and strict liability-one
grounded in fault and one in which fault is considered irreletioned liability; but just as convincing is an argument that certainty of at
least partial liability will have a deterring effect. Also, modern joinder rules
defeat the old argument that contribution would encourage a multiplicity of
suits. See Allocation of Loss, supra note 2, at 730-31.
57. Besides repeated citation of negligence cases, the court expressly
refers to fault in its criticism of the no-contribution rule, stating that the
application of "all-or-nothing liability based on terms of active-passive negligence ... to the ever-increasing situations where there is some fault attributable to both parties produces harsh effects without uniformity of
result," and repeating this language with respect to loan receipt agreements. 70 111.
2d at 12, 374 N.E.2d at 441 (emphasis added).
It should be noted that several references to fault were deleted by the
majority from the slip opinion when it was revised. However, it has been
suggested that this change was one of semantics rather than substance and
was primarily to meet the objection of Justice Dooley that fault is outside
the scope of strict product liability. Ferrini, From Indemnity to Contribution, supra note 1, at 254.
58. STUDY COMMrrrEE REPORT ON INDEMNITY, THIRD PARTY ACTIONS AND
EQUITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS, 1976 REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS JUDICIAL CONFERENCE

59.
60.
61.
62.

(emphasis added). 70 Ill. 2d at 13, 374 N.E.2d at 442.
55 Ill.
2d 84, 302 N.E.2d 40 (1973).
70 IlM. 2d at 10, 374 N.E.2d at 441.
Id.
30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972).
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vant. 63 Chief Justice Ward points out in his dissenting opinion
that there is no "common standard of comparison" present in
Skinner on which to base contribution. 64 To determine
whether contribution should be extended to relieve parties
found liable for their products under a theory of strict liability, a
careful examination of the theories and policies underlying the
adoption of strict liability is necessary.
Contribution in the Context of Strict Liability

In Illinois, strict liability was recognized as a basis for recovery in cases involving products in Suvada v. White Motor
Company.65 Crucial to the Suvada court's decision were
strong public policy arguments for the protection of injured consumers, including an interest in guarding human life and health
and in placing the burden of loss on the party who creates the
66
risk, solicits purchasers, or profits from the enterprise.
The Suvada court concurred with the Restatement position
on product liability. 67 The Restatement comments express the
63. See Mitchell, Products Liability, Workmen's Compensation and the
Industrial Accident, 14 DuQ. L. REv. 349, 361 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
Mitchell, The IndustrialAccident].
64. 70 IMI. 2d at 19, 374 N.E.2d at 445.
65. 32111. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965). In Suvada the manufacturer of a
defective component part was held liable to a subpurchaser for amounts
paid to persons injured as a result of the defect. The court explicitly held
that privity was no longer a defense in tort actions against parties liable for
defective products. The court noted that liability in tort for a defective
product extends to a manufacturer, a seller, a contractor, a supplier, one
who holds himself out to be a manufacturer, the assembler of parts, and the
manufacturer of a component part.
66. The court stated:
[P]ublic interest in human life and health, the invitations and solicitations to purchase the product and the justice of imposing the loss on
the one creating the risk and reaping the profit are present and...
compelling in cases involving motor vehicles and other products, where
the defective condition makes them unreasonably dangerous.
Id. at 619, 210 N.E.2d at 186.
67.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) states:

(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer,
or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product,
and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation
and sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any contractual relation with the seller.
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view that the marketor of a product has assumed a special responsibility to the consuming public and should therefore bear,
as a cost of production, the burden of injuries caused by his
products. 68 In this manner the loss is ultimately borne by the
consuming public and thus distributed to society, since the manufacturer increases product prices to accomodate the cost of injuries incurred.69 In return, the public receives protection via a
reduced burden of proof of liability.70 The deterrence of defective design and manufacture is another important policy favoring strict product liability. Furthermore, where proof of
negligence was previously required for recovery, consumers
were inadequately protected from the inevitable injury arising
71
from mass production.
The foregoing policies are compelling reasons for the imposition of loss upon manufacturers under strict liability theories
in products cases. 72 Although public policy is the very heart of
strict liability, the majority in Skinner addresses the policy issue superficially, citing Suvada for support. The court declares
that the policies enumerated in Suvada are satisfied when strict
liability has been imposed on any defendant. 73 This conclusion, however, does not necessarily follow.
Part of the Suvada rationale is to impose the burden of loss
on the party creating the risk,74 which would seem to be the
party creating the defect in the product. 7 5 Skinner divides this
loss by permitting a strictly liable manufacturer who creates a
defective product to receive contribution from a party not even
68. Id. at Reporter's Note Comment c. See Greenman v. Yuba Power

Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 64, 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1963).
69. See Mitchell, The IndustrialAccident, supra note 63, at 361.
70. Id. Rather than bearing the burden of proving negligence, a plaintiff seeking recovery under a strict liability theory need only prove the elements enumerated in § 402A of the Restatement (Second).

See note 67

supra.
71. See Peterson v. Lou Bachrodt Chevrolet Co., 61 Ill. 2d 17, 20, 329

N.E.2d 785, 786 (1975); Dunham v. Vaughan & Bushnell Mfg. Co., 42 Ill. 2d

339, 344, 247 N.E.2d 401, 404 (1969); Jensvold, A Modern Approach, supra
note 8, at 724.
72. Justice Dooley in his dissent contends that "[iut is clear that the
objectives of the doctrine are to protect the consumer and to make responsible the manufacturers who put into commerce unreasonably dangerous
products which cause injury. If these goals are to be accomplished, ultimate liability for injury must rest on the manufacturer." 70 Inl. 2d at 28, 3.74
N.E.2d at 449.
73. Id. at 14, 374 N.E.2d at 443.
74. See note 66 supra.
75. In order to reconcile the Skinner holding with this policy, a third
party's assumption of the risk of the danger of a defective product would be
paramount to creating the risk for his portion of the blame. This undercuts
the intention of strict product liability that the actual perpetrator of the defect bear total responsibility for injuries arising therefrom.
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involved in its manufacture. This could substantially dilute the
effectiveness of strict product liability in implementing its pub76
The Skinner
lic policy objectives, as Justice Dooley notes.
court also cites Liberty Mutual Insurance Company v. Williams
Machine & Tool Company77 for the proposition that contribution and indemnity should apply once strict liability has been

imposed 78 but overlooks an important distinction between
Skinner and Liberty Mutual; in Liberty Mutual, indemnity was

sought from an entity higher in the chain of distribution of the
product.
A major consideration in Skinner should be whether to permit indemnification to issue from parties lower in the chain of
distribution. 79 In most strict liability jurisdictions, parties may
seek recovery from those above them in the chain of distribution.80 Thus, an injured party may sue the ultimate purchaser,
who may sue the seller, who may sue the manufacturer of the
finished product, who may sue the manufacturer of the defective
component part; or any party could sue anyone above him in the
82
81
progression. In Liberty Mutual, although the plaintiff
sought indemnity for amounts paid in settlement with the injured parties, the court did refer to the fact that both manufacturers "could have been sued directly in strict liability by the
2d at 28, 374 N.E.2d at 449.
76. 70 Ill.
2d 77, 338 N.E.2d 857 (1975).
77. 62 Ill.

Liberty Mutual upheld a shifting

of loss from a manufacturer of a product to the manufacturer of the defec-

tive component part causing the injury. The court held that the misconduct of a manufacturer will not necessarily preclude his seeking indemnity
from the manufacturer of a component part, if it is merely contributory negligence. The court rejected the active-passive test and eliminated negligence as an element of strict liability and therefore contributory negligence
as a defense to indemnity in strict liability cases; however, it designated
misuse of a product and assumption of risk as bars to indemnity.
78. 70 Il. 2d at 14, 374 N.E.2d at 443.
79. In one of Skinner's companion cases, Stevens v. Silver Mfg. Co., 70
Ill. 2d 41, 45, 374 N.E.2d 455, 457 (1977), the third-party defendant argued that
indemnity in product liability should be limited to "upstream" actions
against parties whose handling of the product preceded that of the party
seeking indemnity. The court merely states, "We do not agree," and cites
Skinner.
80. See Jensvold, A Modern Approach, supra note 8, at 730 wherein the
author states:
The doctrinal underpinnings which allow the party at the beginning
of the distribution chain to be held liable for the entire harm suffered
by the plaintiff are not unique to strict liability cases. One who furnishes a defective product to another breaches an implied warranty of
merchantability for which an action for indemnity will lie.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
81. 62 111. 2d 77, 338 N.E.2d 857 (1975).

82. The plaintiff was the manufacturer of a product and settled with a
party injured by the product and then sought indemnity from the manufacturer of the component part whose defect caused the injury. Id.
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injured party. '8 3 This suggests that even had there been an actual adjudication against the plaintiff manufacturer in strict liability, the manufacturer still could have sought indemnity from
the defendant. Relying upon commentators, 84 the Liberty
Mutual court quotes that strict liability "is a liability based
upon the placing into commerce a product which, if defective, is
85 and
likely to be unreasonably dangerous under normal use"
'86
should "trace back to the originally responsible party.
In Liberty Mutual indemnity was employed to reach the
"originally responsible party" and to impose the loss at the root
of the problem. In Skinner, however, the court permitted a
party found strictly liable in tort to seek partial recovery from a
party below it in the distribution chain--one who could not even
have been sued by plaintiff.8 7 Skinner would relieve the "originally responsible party," the manufacturer of a defective product, of part of the burden of loss by transferring such loss to a
party beneath it in the distribution chain.
Under the Skinner theory of allocation of loss, strict liability
loses much of its leverage as a consumer protection instrument 88 since manufacturers of defective products no longer necessarily bear the full burden of compensating victims for harm
arising from defective products they market. Justice Dooley adamantly criticizes the majority opinion, charging that the doctrine of strict liability has been "implicitly overruled" and its
intent "frustrated" by allowing a manufacturer to pass his liability to another.8 9 Even more difficult to understand than its attempted reconciliation of strict liability policies with
contribution is the majority's use of assumption of risk and misuse of a product as the very basis of contribution.
83. Id. at 82, 338 N.E.2d at 859.
84. 2 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN,

PRODUCTS LiABILrrY,

§ 16A(4)(b)(i)

(1978).
85. 62 Ill. 2d at 82, 338 N.E.2d at 860 (emphasis added).

86. Id. at 82, 338 N.E.2d at 860.
87. 'The contribution defendant must be a tortfeasor, and originally lia-

ble to the plaintiff. If there was never any such liability, as where he has
the defense of ... assumption of risk,. . . or the substitution of workmen's
compensation for common law liability, then he is not liable for contribution." PROSSER, supra note 4, § 50, at 309. Justice Dooley questions: "How
can an employer, who cannot be termed a tortfeasor, be sued for apportionment of damages in the nature of contribution or indemnity?" 70 Ill. 2d at
29, 374 N.E.2d at 449.
88. See notes 65-72 and accompanying text supra.
89. 70 Ill. 2d at 22-23, 374 N.E.2d at 447.
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Assumption of Risk and Misuse of Product as Groundsfor
Contribution

Assumption of risk and misuse of a product have traditionally been defenses to strict liability which, if proved, bar recovery.90 The character of assumption of risk, originally a defense
to negligence charges, 9 1 has been altered in its application to
product liability actions 92 to conform to the different policy
objectives. 93 Standards for the invocation of assumption of risk
and misuse in strict liability cases in Illinois were set forth in
94
Williams v. Brown Manufacturing Company, wherein the
95
court held that a plaintiff who assumes the risk or misuses a
97
96
Assumption of risk
product could be barred from recovery.
was designated as an affirmative defense which would bar recov99
ery,98 and misuse was recognized as a possible bar to recovery.
90. See PROSSER, supra note 4, § 68, at 456.
91. Id. at 439.
92. Twerski, Old Wine in a New Flask-RestructuringAssumption of
Risk in the Products LiabilityEra, 60 IOWA L. REV. 1, 3 (1974). Assumption
of risk as a defense to strict liability has been labeled "an amalgam of assumption of risk and contributory negligence." According to the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Reporter's Notes, § 402A, comment n (1965):
Contributory negligence of the plaintiff is not a defense when such negligence consists merely in a failure to discover the defect in the product,
or to guard against, the possibility of its existence. On the other hand,
the form of contributory negligence which consists in voluntarily and
unreasonably proceeding to encounter a known danger, and commonly
passes under the name of assumption of risk, is a defense under this
Section as in other cases of strict liability. If the user or consumer discovers the defect and is aware of the danger, and nevertheless proceeds
unreasonably to make use of the product and is injured by it, he is
barred from recovery.
93. Comment, The Knowledge Element of Assumption of Risk as a Defense to Strict Products Liability, 10 J. MAR. J. 243, 249 (1977). Assumption
of risk in product liability deals with the degree of responsibility a consumer should provide for his own protection in light of the manufacturer's
superior capability to discover unreasonable danger in its products and the
consumer's right to rely on the manufacturer's expertise.
94. 45 Ill. 2d 418, 261 N.E.2d 305 (1970). In Williams, the plaintiff brought
an action in strict product liability in tort to recover for injuries sustained
while operating a trenching machine manufactured by the defendant.
95. Assumption of risk arises when a plaintiff "knows a product is in a
dangerous condition and proceeds in disregard of this known danger." Id.
at 426, 261 N.E.2d at 309.
96. Misuse of a product is use by a plaintiff "for a purpose neither intended nor 'foreseeable' (objectively reasonable) by the defendant." Id. at
425, 261 N.E.2d at 309.
97. Accord, Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Williams Mach. & Tool Co., 62 Iln. 2d
77, 81, 338 N.E.2d 357 859 (1973) ("misuse of the product or assumption of
risk would bar recovery in a strict liability action").
98. 45 111. 2d at 430, 261 N.E.2d at 312 (1970). "We emphasize that 'assumption of risk' is an affirmative defense which does bar recovery, and
which may be asserted in a strict liability action notwithstanding the absence of any contractual relationship between the parties." See Ralston v.
Illinois Power Co., 13 Ill. App. 3d 95, 299 N.E.2d 497 (1973), where, in a work-
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Thus, assumption of risk must be introduced by defendant, but
misuse may relate to plaintiff's proof of causation. 0 0
Assumption of risk and misuse of a product, the very crux of
the court's holding in Skinner, 01 are discussed by the majority
10 2
only fleetingly in the final two paragraphs of the opinion.
Whether described as an affirmative defense which completely
bars recovery or as evidence against proximate cause, assumption of risk and misuse have previously operated to cut off recovery in strict liability actions. 10 3 The Skinner court does not
expressly qualify the meaning of these terms for purposes of its
opinion; but presupposing that the court uses "assumption of
risk" and "misuse of a product" in their legal sense, a circuitous
interpretation of the holding will ensue.
The concept that assumption of risk and misuse of a product
bar recovery indicates that if these factors are proven, a manufacturer will not be liable in the first instance for loss due to injuries caused by his product. Under such a literal reading of the
court's use of these terms, there could be no strict liability from
which to seek contribution,' ° 4 and the court's holding would be
man's action against the manufacturer of a trencher with a hydraulic boring
attachment to recover for personal injuries, the court found that "as a matter of law, he assumed the risk and is barred from recovering from the appellant." Id. at 98, 299 N.E.2d at 499.
99. 45 Ill. 2d at 431, 261 N.E.2d at 312 (1970). "[Pilaintiffs misuse of the
product may bar recovery. This issue may arise in connection with
plaintiff's proof of an unreasonably dangerous condition or in proximate
causation or both."
100. See Mullen v. General Motors Corp., 32 Ill. App. 3d 122, 133, 336
N.E.2d 338, 345 (1975) (in a strict liability action for personal injuries resulting from a tire blow-out, the court held that "[t]he plaintiff in an Illinois
products liability case need not prove the exercise of care to discover a
manufacturing defect, and it is the defendant's burden to raise the issue of
assumption of risk"); Reese v. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R., 5 Ill. App. 3d 450, 454,
283 N.E.2d 517, 520 (1972) (in an action premised on strict liability to recover
damages for the death of plaintiffs deceased when struck by the bucket of a
crane while working for the railroad, the court held that misuse of a product
"is [not] a facet of the affirmative defense of assumption of risk" and that
"[ di efendant was entitled under Williams to show misuse of the product on
the issue of causation").
101. It is clear that, although Reed charged Hinckley with negligence in
seeking contribution, the supreme court intends to limit contribution to
cases where assumption of risk and misuse exist. In three other cases
seeking apportionment of loss, decided contemporaneously with Skinner,
contribution was allowed in two of the cases where assumption of risk or
misuse was alleged. See Stevens v. Silver Mfg. Co., 70 Ill. 2d 41, 374 N.E.2d
455 (1977); Robinson v. International Harvester, 70 Ill. 2d 47, 374 N.E.2d 458
(1977). However, where only contributory negligence existed, contribution
was denied. See Buehler v. Whalen, 70 Ill. 2d 51, 374 N.E.2d 460 (1977).
2d at 15-16, 374 N.E.2d at 443.
102. See 70 Ill.
103. See notes 94-100 and accompanying text supra.
104. As Justice Underwood remarks: "If misuse and assumption of risk
bar recovery, as they heretofore have, what is there to contribute to?" 70
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devoid of meaning. Therefore, since the court must be using
the terms in an innovative sense, it can be speculated that the
court is suggesting a doctrine of assumption of part of the risk
or implying that assumption of risk and misuse are partial defenses which reduce rather than bar liability. 10 5
The court also fails to address another assumption of risk
and misuse issue vital to its holding. The majority acknowledges that recovery is barred and indemnity precluded where a
user assumes the risk or misuses a product, 1°6 but it fails to relate these principles to its conclusion that either may be the basis of a cause of action for contribution.10 7 In the past
assumption of risk and misuse have been tools for a party being
sued to assert against the party suing him, 10 8 not a basis for a
separate action to recovery from a third party. Justice Dooley
points out that assumption of risk by an uninjured party is a
"concept unknown to the law in the 140 years of the existence of
the doctrine .... It cannot be the basis of a third party ac-

tion."'1 9 The majority offers no explanation for its ambiguous
holding and leaves the future application of these new principles to conjecture.
The Proprietyof JudicialAction
Another area of concern in Skinner is whether the assertion
of contribution, particularly in view of the state's workmen's
compensation statute, 10 was a proper question for the courts.
The dissenting opinions in Skinner suggest that the court overstepped its authority. Chief Justice Ward notes a parallel
between apportionment under contribution and under comparaIll. 2d at 21, 374 N.E.2d at 446. See Noel, Manufacturer'sNegligence of Design or Directionsfor Use of a Product, 71 YALE L.J. 816, 869 (1962). "Because of [knowledge of the risk] recovery often is denied not only to the
informed purchaser himself, who may be guilty of contributory fault, but
also to third persons who are not informed of the danger, usually on the
ground that the use of the product by the informed purchaser is a 'superseding cause' which insulates the manufacturer's negligence."
105. It has been suggested that economic loss be apportioned on a percentage basis among those responsible for all "independent and concurrent
causes." Jensvold, A Modern Approach, supra note 8, at 725.
106. 70 Ill.
2d at 15, 374 N.E.2d at 443. "Misuse of the product or assumption of risk by a user will serve to bar his recovery ...and indemnity is not
available to one who misuses the product or assumes the risk of its use."
107. Id. "We are of the opinion that if the manufacturer's third-party
complaint alleges that the employer's misuse of the product or assumption
of risk of its use contributed to cause plaintiff's injuries, the manufacturer
has stated a cause of action for contribution."
108. See note 94 and accompanying text supra.
2d at 23, 374 N.E.2d at 447.
109. 70 1ll.
110. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.5 (1977).
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tive negligence,'1 1 which the supreme court has previously ruled
to be a matter for the legislature. 1 12 Justice Dooley states that,
whether or not "the contentions of the majority are for the legislature. . .. they are not for us. ' 113 Justice Underwood reasons
that such substantial change in Illinois tort law should be left to
the legislature in compliance with constitutional separation of
powers principles and in order to simultaneously and compre114
hensively consider and act upon all aspects of the new law.
A related area of concern is the court's imposition of liability
upon an employer in excess of workmen's compensation liability." 5 There is no discussion of the policy underlying workmen's compensation. 116 The majority merely remarks that
Reed's action for contribution should not be precluded by the
fact that the Workmen's Compensation Act bars plaintiff from
suing Hinckley directly, 1 7 citing Miller v. DeWitt. 118 There the
court upheld an architect's third-party complaint seeking indemnity from a contractor for liability for injuries to the contractor's employee. As Justice Underwood points out,1 9 the fact
that the contractor's conduct was more culpable than the architect's was instrumental in the Miller court's determination that
an employer may be liable in excess of workmen's compensation limitations. 120 The fact that "tortfeasors are each chargea111. 70 IM.2d at 19, 374 N.E.2d at 445.
2d 193, 239 N.E.2d 445 (1968). It should be noted,
112. Maki v. Frelk, 40 Ill.
however, that Justice Ward dissented in Maki, maintaining that the court

was a proper forum for establishing comparative negligence.
2d at 37, 374 N.E.2d at 453.
113. 70 Ill.
114. Id. at 22, 374 N.E.2d at 446.
115. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.5(a) (1977).
Compensation Act provides:

The Illinois Workmen's

(a) No common law or statutory right to recover damages from the
employer [or] his insurer ... for injury or death sustained by any employee while engaged in the line of his duty as such employee, other
than the compensation herein provided, is available to any employee
who is covered by the provisions of this Act.
Workmen's compensation was developed as "a system of no-fault compensation" where an employer procures insurance which pays limited amounts
to employees injured on the job, with no prerequisite of proof that the employer was negligent. "[P] ayment of compensation [is I determined by an
evaluation of the employee's status at the time of his injury rather than an
evaluation of the employer's fault."

Mitchell, The Industrial AccidenA

supra note 63, at 352.
116. See note 25 supra.
117. 70 Ill.
2d at 16-17, 374 N.E.2d at 443.
2d 273, 226 N.E.2d 630 (1967). An architect's third-party com118. 37 Ill.
plaint seeking indemnity from a contractor for injuries to contractor's employee was upheld.
119. 70 111. 2d at 20, 374 N.E.2d at 445.
120. The Miller court specifically allowed "a third party who was not actively negligent to obtain indemnification from an employer who was actively negligent." 37 111. 2d 273, 289, 226 N.E.2d 630, 640 (1967).
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ble with active or affirmative negligence,' 121 as in Skinner,
would distinguish it from Miller. Thus the court seems to be
allowing to be done directly what
circumventing legislation by
122
cannot be done indirectly.
CONCLUSION

The potential ramifications of Skinner are numerous but
highly speculative due to the ambiguity of the holding. It is unclear whether contribution will be limited to factual situations
similar to Skinner or expanded to include other circumstances. 123 A major omission in Skinner is a plan for the implementation of contribution once it is established as appropriate
relief. 24 As Justice Dooley notes, the court does not address
the theory upon which loss will be apportioned. 125 Although at
common law contribution was generally applied equally among
the liable parties, 26 the language of the court 127 indicates that in
Illinois loss will be distributed among the parties in proportion
to the percentage of harm each caused. 28 A consideration of
129
the parallel between contribution and comparative negligence
illustrates the unresolved problems in this context. Under the
modified comparative negligence doctrine, a plaintiff who is fifty
130
percent or more contributorily negligent may recover nothing.
Applying this principle to contribution, the question arises
whether a defendant who causes more than half of plaintiffs
harm may seek contribution from another party who contrib121. 70 IIl. 2d at 33, 374 N.E.2d at 451.
122. In Skinner, Hinckley may be indirectly responsible to plaintiff for
amounts above workmen's compensation limitations through its contribution to Reed.
123. It has been suggested that the Skinner court did not intend to restrict its holding to products cases and that contribution will find general
application, as indicated by the court's unqualified conclusion that there "is
no valid reason for the continued existence of the no-contribution rule."
See Ferrini, From Indemnity to Contribution, supra note 1, at 267, 270-72.
However, an appellate court opinion subsequent to Skinner was more cautious, noting that the supreme court "now permits contribution between
joint tortfeasors based upon relative degrees of fault." See City of West
Chicago v. Clark, 58 Ill. App. 3d 847, 856, 374 N.E.2d 1277, 1283 (1978).
124. 70 Ill. 2d at 23, 374 N.E.2d at 447.
125. See id. at 39, 374 N.E.2d at 454.
126. See note 9 and accompanying text supra.
127. The court bases contribution on "the relative degree" of the cause of
plaintiff's harm. 70 111. 2d at 16, 374 N.E.2d at 443.
128. For example, for injuries amounting to $1,000, a party causing 60% of
the harm would pay $600 and one causing 40% of the harm $400.
129. Both provide for a distribution of loss among parties who have contributed to the injury. See generally Schwartz, Practice Under Comparative Negligence, supra note 7.

130. See id. at 750.
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uted to the injury. 3 1 Since Illinois does not follow comparative
negligence, 132 it will not be bound by these principles, however.
The Skinner court's recognition of contribution also casts
doubt upon how long Illinois' judicial rejection of comparative
negligence principles 133 can endure. In Skinner, assumption of
risk and misuse of a product were asserted by a manufacturer
(M) against a third party, the employer (E), in an action for contribution. If M is to remain partially liable when assumption of
risk or misuse of a product by a third party is shown, how can M
rationally be totally absolved from liability when he uses the
same doctrines defensively against the injured plaintiff (p)?134
Such a result would hold P wholly responsible for his loss but
would leave third-party E responsible only to the extent that he
contributed to the harm, although the misconduct of both P and
E is equally culpable. The extent of M's net liability would then
be predicated upon the finding of liability as to P or E. Even if
both are liable for the same misconduct, the mere fact that P is
the party injured and seeking recovery would relieve M of any
responsibility whatever, whereas M would have to share the
loss of a plaintiff's injury with an uninjured third party, E, who
contributed to the injury in exactly the same manner. To
achieve consistency and fairness where contribution is applied
to strict liability, a manufacturer's responsibility should correspond to his portion of culpability and should not depend on
whether or not the other culpable party is the party seeking recovery. This paradox should compel Illinois to re-evaluate the
principles behind comparative responsibility where a plaintiff
135
contributes to his own injury.
The court also fails to designate under what procedural circumstances contribution may be sought. 36 In Skinner and its
131. However, pure comparative negligence allows a plaintiff to recover
whatever amount a defendant contributes to his injury; thus a plaintiff 90%
contributorily negligent may still recover 10% from the defendant, so under
that analogy the problem would not arise with contribution. See id. at 748.
132. Maki v. Frelk, 40 Ill. 2d 193, 239 N.E.2d 445 (1968).
133. See id.
134. An appellate court opinion stated that Skinner "reaffirmed, in
dictum, previous case law that misuse of a product or assumption of the
risk, bars recovery by a user or indemnity to a third-party plaintiff." AngeApp. 3d 116, 120, 374 N.E.2d 218 (1978).
lini v. Snow, 58 Ill.
135. A post-Skinner appellate court decision disagrees that Skinner rejects the foundations of the rule against comparative negligence and concludes that contributory negligence law is unchanged by Skinner. See id.

at 120-22, 374 N.E.2d at 218-19. There is nevertheless an unjustified inconsistency in permitting loss to be allocated among defendants but not between
plaintiff and defendant.
136. Justice Dooley asks: "What will be the vehicle of apportionment of
damages between wrongdoers? Will it be by third-party action, by counter-
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progeny, 3 7 third-party complaints were filed. The Skinner
court does not expressly limit contribution to third-party actions
though. It leaves unresolved whether contribution may be
sought via cross-claims among defendants joined in an action, or
by independent actions against nonparties, or whether it may be
applied automatically to multiple defendants. Extension of
contribution in the latter case could adversely affect plaintiffs'
rights. Traditionally, a plaintiff who sues several defendants
can execute a judgment against any defendant for the entire
amount. 13 8 If Skinner is construed so that liability is allocated
among defendants and a plaintiff can recover from each defendant only to the extent of that defendant's liability, a plaintiff's
ability to recover for his injuries will be impaired. 139 If Skinner
is limited to third-party actions for contribution or cross-claims,
plaintiffs' traditional rights may be preserved. A plaintiff could
still execute a judgment against any defendant, and that defendant could then seek contribution in a separate action. 140 Since
the Skinner court deals with rights of defendants as to each
other, the latter approach appears more likely,14' but the court
did not indicate its position on the other possibilities and they
remain open.
Besides potentially restricting plaintiffs' rights, it appears
that Skinner also has narrowed defendants' rights. Previously,
assumption of risk and misuse of a product operated to completely cut off a manufacturer's liability for harm resulting from
its product. 142 If a finding of assumption of risk and misuse of
product are construed to no longer preclude a finding of liability
of a manufacturer sued in strict liability, manufacturers have
lost what were once very favorable doctrines that completely negated liability. 14 3 Thus, although the court appears to be protecting manufacturers by providing a right to contribution, it
actually has imposed liability where none would otherwise have
claim between defendants, by independent actions, or by all such vehicles?"
70 Ill. 2d at 39, 374 N.E.2d at 454.
137. Stevens v. Silver Mfg. Co., 70 Ill.
2d 41, 374 N.E.2d 455 (1977); Robinson v. International Harvester Co., 70 Ill.
2d 47, 374 N.E.2d 458 (1977).
138. See notes 5-6 and accompanying text supra.
139. For example, a plaintiff who is unable to recover against an insolvent defendant will not be able to seek that party's share of the loss from a
co-defendant with funds.
140. In this way, the burden of an insolvent defendant's share would be
borne by the other defendants.
141. Matten, Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors, 66 ILL. B.J. 478, 480

(1978).
142. See notes 94-100 and accompanying text supra.
143. Justice Underwood concludes that "the manufacturer has now been
shorn of the sole protection he formerly had against strict liability actions
and has become the insurer of the user." 70 IM.2d at 21-22, 374 N.E.2d at 446.
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existed. In this sense it has enhanced plaintiffs position by increasing her chance of recovery, since upon failure to prove
strict liability, plaintiffs only recourse would be a statutorily
limited workmen's compensation claim. 144
Another question that Skinner raises is whether indemnity
still exists in Illinois, since the opinion concentrates on contribution as the new basis for apportioning loss among tortfeasors.
Indemnity has been characterized as one extreme of the continuum of contribution. 4 It has been proposed that indemnity
will retain a very viable function after the Skinner holding takes
effect, 14 based upon the doctrine of active-passive misconduct,
and that a complete shifting of loss will remain appropriate
where one party is held liable on a purely technical basis and
the other party is 100 percent culpable. 147 An appellate court
decision has also indicated that Skinner will not affect specific
indemnity agreements against negligence, 14 leaving the option
of contractual indemnity intact.
It is ironic that a court which was a pioneer in strict product
liability litigation has now weakened the doctrine by relieving
the party who introduces an inherently dangerous defective
product into commerce from exclusive responsibility for injuries
arising therefrom. 149 Apparently strict liability can no longer be
equated with sole liability for loss. The Skinner court has taken
144. Possibly if an employer's culpability exceeds mere negligence to the
point of voluntary assumption of risk or misuse, plaintiff might have a cause
of action against employer to recover amounts above workmen's compensation limitations, under a theory that workmen's compensation limits an employer's liability only for mere negligence. This would give plaintiff a cause
of action against the party proximately causing the harm.
145. Ferrini, From Indemnity to Contribution,supra note 1, at 268. "Indemnity may be properly viewed... as simply the extremity of a broad
spectrum, the same spectrum within which we find contribution."
146. The Skinner decision "will apply prospectively to causes of action
arising out of occurrences on and after March 1, 1978." 70 Ill. 2d at 17, 374
N.E.2d at 444.
147. Ferrini, From Indemnity to Contribution, supra note 1, at 268. A
post-Skinner appellate court decision continued its use of active-passive
negligence criteria in requiring indemnity but indicated that results would
differ if Skinner were applicable. See Johnson v. Equipment Specialists,
Inc., 58 111. App. 3d 133, 373 N.E.2d 837 (1978) (defendant found to be actively
negligent was denied indemnity, but the court said results would be different if Skinner were applicable at that time).
148. See Quilico v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 58 Ill.
App. 3d 87, 374 N.E.2d 219
(1978) (defendant found liable to plaintiff under the Structural Work Act
received indemnity from plaintiff's employer; Skinner was not applied to
the determination of indemnity due to both its prospective application and
the contractual basis for the indemnity sought).
149. The dissentors are convinced that Skinner alters strict liability beyond recognition," 70 IMI. 2d at 21, 374 N.E.2d at 446, and Justice Dooley flatly
states that facets of strict liability have been "implicitly overruled." Id. at
22-23, 374 N.E.2d at 447.
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a result-orientated approach to what it viewed as an inequitable
and unsatisfactory state of existing law governing the apportionment of liability. Perhaps the most rational approach to the
holding until it is clarified by future litigation is that parties who
may be found jointly liable for unintentionally harming a plaintiff, regardless of the theory of liability, will have a right of contribution as to each other. 5 0 Established notions of assumption
of risk and misuse of a product and their relationship to strict
liability must be modified to incorporate a balancing approach
whereby responsibility of multiple parties for injury can be
weighed and loss proportioned accordingly.
Susan H. Maynard

150. "[CJontribution and indemnity approaches should be combined
....
It seems sensible under either doctrine to apportion liability on the
basis of the comparative fault or responsibility of the tortfeasors and to allow contribution and indemnity regardless of whether the defendant is immune from liability to the original claimant." Phillips, Contribution and
Indemnity, supra note 24, at 87. Loss allocation should be "among all persons whose conduct was in some significant manner responsible for the
plaintiff's loss," under a "comparative responsibility" doctrine. Jensvold, A
Modern Approach, supra note 8, at 739.

